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Abstract
The standard of proof in criminal law a®ects retributive justice through
the number of wrong convictions and wrong acquittals. It also a®ects the
level of crime, since a higher standard of proof implies less deterrence and
less incapacitation. This article derives an expression for the optimal stan-
dard from a trade-o® between these e®ects, and applies the expression to
the crime of sexual violation against women. For this crime, social pref-
erences for justice versus prevention of crime are elicited through a survey
and inserted into the expression for the optimal standard. The result indi-
cates that the concern for prevention of crime may have a signi¯cant e®ect
on the optimal standard of proof.
¤I wish to thank Steven Levitt for providing empirical estimates of the preventive e®ect
of sanctions, and Clas Wihlborg for extensive comments. Also, I thank participants at the
American Law and Economics Association Conference at Harvard Law School, May 2002. Peter
Schmidt and Jens Dick-Nielsen provided able research assistance.
Introduction
According to a prevalent view, the standard of proof in criminal law should
balance the number of wrong acquittals with the number of wrong convictions so
as to minimize the sum of `injustice costs' from these two types of error. This
article investigates the consequences of also including the concern for prevention
of crime as a determinant of the optimal standard of proof. Naturally, a higher
standard will in general increase the level of crime, since it will lead to less de-
terrence and less incapacitation of criminals. Therefore, including the concern
for preventing crime will tend to lower the socially optimal standard of proof.
This article inquires into the potential size of this e®ect. I ¯rst derive - within
a Becker-type [2] model of crime - a general expression for the optimal standard
of proof as it depends on social preferences concerning justice and prevention of
crime and on the elasticity of crime with respect to the expected sanction. Then I
apply the expression to the particular crime of sexual violation of women. For this
crime, the standard of proof is well-known to play an important role for the out-
come of legal trials, so in this respect the crime seems well suited for illustrating
the potential importance of including the concern for preventing crime. In e®ect,
I demonstrate that for this crime, the optimal standard falls from 92% to 67%
when prevention of crime is taken into account. Thus, the analysis suggests that
the concern for prevention of crime may have a substantial e®ect on the standard
of proof. Indeed, if it is correct to associate the standard `beyond a reasonable
doubt' with 95% (subjective) certainty and `clear and convincing evidence' with
75% certainty, as some do (e.g. Schauer and Zeckhauser [24]), the analysis sug-
gests that for the crime of sexual violation of women including the concern for
prevention lowers the standard from `beyond a reasonable doubt' to `clear and
convincing evidence'.
For the crime of sexual violation, social preferences for justice and prevention
will be derived from survey answers to the two following questions: `How many
guilty people are you willing to let go free to avoid that someone is wrongly con-
victed of sexual violation?' and `How many sexual violations can you/are you
willing to accept in order to avoid that someone is wrongly convicted of sexual
violation?'. The optimal standard is found by inserting the survey population's
median responses to these two questions, together with an estimate of the pre-
ventive e®ect of sanctions, into the expression for the optimal standard.
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Structure
Before introducing the model, I shall review the law and economics literature
on the subject of the standard of proof, and discuss whether the risk of being
innocently convicted should be seen as a®ecting the incentive to commit crime.
This issue will be discussed at some length, since it will be assumed in the model
that there is no e®ect on incentives of wrong convictions, which may appear
counterintuitive. After the discussion of this point, the model will be presented,
and the main result will be derived and applied to the crime of sexual violation
against women. A discussion and a conclusion end the paper.
The Literature
The articles by Schrag and Scotchmer [25] and Farmer and Terrell [9] are
closely related to this.
Like this paper, Schrag and Scotchmer weigh justice and prevention concerns,
but their focus is primarily on which kind of evidence should be allowed in court,
rather than on how much evidence should su±ce for conviction. In particular,
they analyze whether character evidence should be allowed in a criminal trial, and
show that allowing character evidence may, under certain circumstances, have a
detrimental e®ect on deterrence of crime, since it may provide criminals who have
committed crime in the past too little incentive to abandon their criminal career.
Farmer and Terrell analyze the following choice involving justice and preven-
tion of crime: when the propensity for crime is higher for one (race or gender)
group than for another, allowing members of the former group to be convicted on
relatively less evidence will lead to more incapacitation at a given cost in terms of
unfair conviction, but will violate the principle of equality before the law. There
is hence a trade-o® between justice and prevention of crime, and they explore the
likely signi¯cance of this trade-o® through simulations of a simple model. Accord-
ing to their simulations, adhering to the principle of equality before the law may
be costly in terms of less incapacitation and hence more crime.
Three papers by, respectively, Rubinfeld and Sappington [22], Miceli [14] and
Yilankaya [28] are worth mentioning because they address an issue that will not
be included in the present analysis but which may be important when setting
the standard of proof. The three papers analyze the e®ect of the standard of
proof and of the size of the sanction on both the prosecutor's e®ort to establish
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guilt and the defendant's e®ort to establish innocence. Thus, Rubinfeld and Sap-
pington investigate how the standard of proof and the size of the sanction a®ect
the defendant's e®ort to signal innocence, Miceli analyzes how the two variables
a®ect prosecutorial e®ort, and Yilankaya explores how the two variables a®ect
both the defendant's and the prosecutor's e®orts, which are seen as strategically
interdependent. In contrast, the present paper abstracts from (`black-boxes') this
and other interactions of the standard of proof with the judicial process1. The
question analyzed in this paper is what level of certainty society should optimally
strive for, and this can be analyzed without going into the process through which
this level of certainty is attained.
Another important article by Miceli [13] should also be mentioned, although it
is not mainly concerned with the standard of proof. He analyzes how much e®ort
the legal system should spend to investigate some given crime and how high the
sanction for the crime should be, as choices involving trade-o®s between justice
(fairness) and e±ciency.
Andreoni [1] argues that higher sanctions may not lead to less crime, since
jurors may adjust the standard of proof to the level of sanctions in order not to
risk sanctioning an innocent person harshly. Andreoni hence points to a con°ict of
interest between jurors and the rest of society; jurors must live with the thought
of perhaps having sanctioned an innocent person, and may therefore have an
incentive to apply a higher standard of proof than that which is in society's
overall interest. This and other agency issues will however not be addressed in
the present paper, since the main aim of this paper is to establish the socially
optimal standard of proof as a benchmark.
Other important law and economics references on the standard of proof in
criminal law are Kaplow [11], Posner [19], Reinganum [21], Kaplow and Shavell
[12], and Polinsky and Shavell [17].
Does the risk of unfair conviction a®ect the incentive to commit
crime?
In the model below, it will be assumed that the incentive to commit crime
1Most importantly, how the standard of proof interacts with the outcome of plea bargaining
will not be analyzed in this paper. For an analysis of plea bargaining, see e.g. Reinganum [21].
Note that the vast majority of felony convictions in the US (approx. 95%) are through plea
bargaining, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Felony Convictions in State Courts, 2000:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf. In contrast, plea bargaining does not exist
as such in many European countries, including Denmark.
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is una®ected by the risk of innocent conviction. This goes against the intuition
that the risk of being wrongly convicted must lower the reward to not committing
crime, and that it must hence act as an inducement to commit crime. However,
this logic does not apply in all circumstances. To take a concrete example, if
Smith decides not to steal Jones's car, Smith need generally not fear being falsely
convicted of having stolen Jones's car for the simple reason that Jones' car has
not been stolen. Naturally, Smith may fear being innocently convicted for another
theft or another crime, but this risk exists whether or not he steals Jones' car2.
Naturally, if Smith does not steal it, he may fear being innocently convicted of
stealing Jones' car, if somebody else steals it. This is the case analyzed by Schrag
and Scotchmer. However, this seems a somewhat special case. First, criminals do
not always compete for a limited set of crime opportunities. There are e.g. many
cars to steal and many banks to rob. Second, for each individual the probability
of being falsely convicted tends to be very low, since many innocent individuals
share the risk3.
The risk of unfair conviction may, however, a®ect the incentive for crime in
other ways than that analyzed by Schrag and Scotchmer. Png [16] cites the
example of a motorcyclist, who even though he or she drives with due care, may
risk being falsely accused of negligent driving in the case of an accident. This,
Png argues, may reduce his or her incentive for exercising due care, by reducing
the expected pay-o® from doing so4. Another and perhaps better example is given
by R. Posner [19], who points out that if the sanction for speeding is applied at
random, it provides no incentive not to speed.
The question then arises what fundamental feature determines when there
is an e®ect on incentives. I submit that the important point lies in de¯ning the
criminal act as a speci¯ c act committed at a given time and place. The question is
whether there can be evidence indicating that a person has committed the speci¯c
act, when he or she has not. When Jones decides not to steal Jones' car, Smith
need not fear being falsely convicted of it, while when Smith decides not to speed
2Of course, if the sanction for one theft is felt less when applied on top of a sanction for
another, the risk of unfair conviction may a®ect the incentive for theft. For several reasons, e.g.
that the sanction is usually increasing in the number of o®enses, this e®ect will not be included
in the analysis.
3Schrag and Scotchmer must have in mind that if Smith does not steal Jones' car, Smith will
be near the place of the car-theft, if somebody else steals it, and will therefore be more likely
to be innocently convicted than the average person. This, again, is a somewhat special case,
although of course it can occur.
4Png ascribes the basic insight to R. Posner in [20].
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at a given point in time, he may nevertheless fear being sanctioned for speeding
at that point in time. This article pertains to such crimes as theft, assault and
murder for which there is almost zero probability of being falsely convicted for
that speci¯c act which one chooses not to commit5.
The Model
The analysis concerns one particular kind of criminal act. Each such act
causes harm, h; to society, and is assumed for simplicity to be undertaken by one
person alone. Potential criminals are assumed to be risk neutral, and, following
the Becker [2] approach to crime, each will commit the crime if the bene¯t, v, is
greater than the expected sanction6. The total population is normalized to one,
and the fraction of the population with bene¯t v is given by the density function
z(v) > 0, and the cumulative distribution function Z(v), both de¯ned on the
interval [0;1[.
Whenever the criminal act has been committed, somebody will report it to
the police, who in turn will undertake an investigation and take the case to court
if there is su±cient evidence against the prime suspect7. The evidence generated
through investigations and court proceedings will be stochastic and may be more
or less incriminating. It will be assumed that the judge/juror can rank the ev-
idence in this respect, and that the ranking can be expressed by a continuous
variable y 2 [0;1[, where the number is higher the more conclusive the evidence.
The ratio of the probability of the prime suspect's guilt (g), and his or her
innocence ( i), can be found from the Bayesian formula P = A £ L, where P is
the ratio:
P =
probability of guilt given the evidence
probability of innocence given the evidence
and A is the ratio:
ex-ante probability of guilt
ex -ante probability of innocence
5Such cases are usually about the identity of the wrongdoer and not about the action of the
wrongdoer, since the existence of a victim is often transparent, and there would not be a victim
if a wrongful act had not been performed.
6Many people will not even think of committing the crime or will have great disutility from
it in terms of loss of esteem from others, etc. This is consistent with the model.
7We are interested in such cases where there is a prime suspect, since if this is not the case,
a criminal conviction will be out of the question (as will be clear).
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where ex-ante refers to the information existing before any evidence is presented.
L is the likelihood ratio, which is:
the probability of observing the evidence given guilt
the probability of observing the evidence given innocence
It will be convenient to split the evidence y into two parts; that which is su±cient
to generate a probability of guilt equal to 12, which we will term y12 , and the
amount of evidence beyond that8, which we will term x9. Note that the posterior
beliefs can be expressed as P = A £ L(y1
2
) £ L(x j y1
2
), where A is the ex-ante
ratio of beliefs before any evidence is presented, L(y1
2
) is the likelihood ratio for
the level of evidence y1
2
and L(x j y1
2
) is the ratio of the conditional probabilities
of observing x when y has been observed. This follows from the fact that the
probability of observing both y1
2
and x equals the probability of observing y1
2
multiplied by the probability of observing x given that one has observed y1
2
. Note
here that A£ L(y 1
2
) equals 1 by the de¯nition of y1
2
; this simpli¯es expressions.
L(x j y1
2
) can be expressed as fg(x)fi(x) where the di®erentiable density function
fg(x) expresses the probability of x forthcoming against the prime suspect, con-
ditional on y1
2
, if it is assumed that the prime suspect did commit the crime, and
fi(x) is the probability of x forthcoming against the prime suspect, conditional
on y1
2
, if it is assumed that some other person than the prime suspect committed
the crime10. Fg and Fi denote the corresponding distribution functions.
It follows from Bayes' formula that:
prob(g j x)
prob(i j x) =
1
2
1
2
¤ fg(x)
fi(x)
8Note that we are only interested in such cases where P exceeds 1, i.e. where the probability
of the prime suspect's guilt is at least equal to 12 .
9This way of representing the evidence, by x instead of by y both simpli¯es calculations and
creates a link between our intuition and the analysis. To illustrate, when we say that there is
more than a preponderance of the evidence, we mean that the evidence would be more likely
to come forth if the suspect did commit the crime than if he or she did not. But in a Bayesian
sense this is only correct if we consider the prior belief that the suspect is guilty to be 12 . So we
are really saying that there is more evidence than that which would create a probability of 12,
and we are not talking about the likelihood ratio which may be much higher than 1 if the prior
probability of the suspect's guilt is very low.
10For consistency, it will be assumed that a potential o®ender and the judge/juror agree on
the density functions fg (x) and fi(x), and there will also be assumed to be agreement on L(y 12 ).
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from which it follows that
prob(g j x) = fg(x);
fg(x) + fi(x)
since prob(g j x) + prob(i j x) = 1:
If the threshold level of x above which there will be conviction is denoted by ex,
the conditional probabilities of the main events can now be stated in terms of the
Fg and the Fi distribution-functions. Thus, the probability that the guilty will be
convicted, prob
n
(x ¸ ex j y 1
2
)\ g
o
, and the probability of somebody being falsely
convicted, prob
n
(x ¸ ex j y1
2
) \ io ; are:
prob
n
(x ¸ ex j y 1
2
)\ go = 1Zex fg(x)dx = 1¡ Fg(ex)
prob
n
(x ¸ ex j y1
2
) \ i
o
= 1¡ Fi(ex)
Let q be the probability that y ¸ y1
2
, i.e. the probability that the evidence
against the prime suspect is such that it is more probable than not that the prime
suspect is guilty. If the sanction is s and the level of utility for which a person
will be exactly deterred is ev, then
ev = s£ q £ 1Zex fg(x)dx
Z(ev) is then the law-abiding part of the population and 1¡ Z(ev) is the criminal
part.
I will incorporate justice concerns into the social welfare function in the same
way as Diamond [6], Miceli [13] and Polinsky and Shavell [18]. When a crime has
been committed, not sanctioning the guilty comes at a social cost Q in terms of
`justice disutility', as compared with the situation where the o®ender is caught
and sanctioned. The social justice cost from not sanctioning the guilty will hence
be (1¡ Z(ev))((1¡ q)Q+ qFg(ex)Q).
The injustice cost incurred by society when a person is innocently convicted
will be denoted µ. The expected cost associated with unfair convictions is hence
(1¡ Z(ev))q(1¡ Fi(ex))µ.
Let c denote the cost to society of applying the sanction, i.e. the cost of
incarceration. It will be applied both when the innocent and when the guilty
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are sanctioned. The total expected sanctioning costs are then: (1¡ Z(ev))q(1 ¡
Fi(ex) + 1¡ Fg(ex))c.
Social welfare is maximized when total social costs SC are minimized with
respect ex. SC can be written11:
(1¡ Z(ev)) [h+ (1¡ q)Q+ qFg(ex)Q+ q(1 ¡ Fi(ex))µ + q(1¡ Fi(ex) + 1¡ Fg(ex))c]
where
ev = s£ q £ 1Zex fg(x)dx
The Optimal Standard of Proof
The optimal standard of proof can be found by inserting the expression for ev
into the social cost function and di®erentiating with respect to ex. It is convenient
¯rst to express social costs as SC = (1¡ Z(ev))(h + w), where (1 ¡ Z(ev)) is the
number of crimes, and where h + w is the total harm per crime, including not
only the direct harm; h, but also the injustice and sanctioning cost per crime, w.
w is given by:
w = (1¡ q)Q+Fg(ex)qQ+ (1¡ Fi(ex))qµ + qc(1¡ Fi(ex) + 1¡ Fg(ex))
where (1 ¡ q)Q + Fg(ex))qQ is the expected injustice cost per crime associated
with the o®ender escaping sanction, (1 ¡ Fi(ex))qµ is the expected injustice cost
per crime due to false conviction, and qc(1¡ Fi(ex) + 1 ¡ Fg(ex)) is the expected
sanctioning cost per crime.
We can simplify the derivative of social cost with respect to the standard of
proof by noting that @ev
@ex = ¡fg(ex)sq, @Z(ev)@ev = z(ev), and that therefore @(1¡Z(ev))@ex =
z(ev)fg(ex)sq. It follows that :
@SC
@ex = (h +w)z(ev)fg(ex)sq + (1¡ Z(ev))@w@ex
In this expression @w@ex equals fg(ex)qQ ¡ qµfi(ex) ¡ (fi(ex) + fg(ex))qc. Denote
the fraction of criminals deterred by a one-unit increase in ev by ®; i.e. ® =
z(ev)=(1¡ Z(ev)). Then @SC
@ex = (h+ w)z(ev)fg(ex)sq + (1¡ Z(ev)) @w@ex , and:
11It is assumed here that the crime is of the kind where the utility derived by the o®ender
by most people would be considered `socially illicit', and so should not be included in the social
welfare function. However, whether or not the utility of the o®ender is included, plays no
important role in what follows.
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@SC
@ex = (h+ w)z(ev)fg(ex)sq + (1¡ Z(ev))@w@ ex = 0 )
(h+ w)z(ev)fg(ex)sq + (1¡ Z(ev)) [fg(ex)qQ¡ qµfi(ex) ¡ (fi(ex) + fg(ex))qc] = 0 )
fi(ex)
fg(ex) = [(h + w)z(
ev)sq + (1¡ Z(ev))(qQ¡ qc)]
(1¡ Z(ev))(qµ + qc) = (h + w)®sq + (qQ¡ qc)(qµ + qc) )
fi(ex) + fg(ex)
fg(ex) = (h + w)®sq + (qQ¡ qc) + (qµ + qc)(qµ + qc) )
fg(ex)
fi(ex) + fg(ex) = (qµ + qc)(h +w)®sq + (qQ¡ qc) + (qµ + qc) = µ + c(h +w)®s+ (Q¡ c) + (µ + c)
which proves the following proposition:
Proposition: The optimal standard of proof, prob(g j ex¤), is given by:
prob(g j ex¤) = fg(ex)
fi(ex) + fg(ex) = µ + c(h+ w)®s+ (Q¡ c) + (µ + c)
Two comments may be made. First, note that in the absence of a deterrent
e®ect, i.e. if z(ev) = 0, the result is
prob(g j ex¤) = µ + c
(Q¡ c) + (µ + c)
This condition equates the marginal relative number of falsely acquitted and
falsely convicted with their relative costs. It should be stressed that the con-
dition is marginal. Thus, if e.g. prob(g j ex¤) equals 90%, this does not mean
that one in every ten verdicts will be an unjust conviction. Rather, it means that
whenever the evidence is at the critical level, the defendant is innocent with a
probability of 10%. A majority of defendants will be found guilty at a higher level
of certainty.
10
Second, note that the extent to which the optimal standard is a®ected by the
concern for prevention of crime depends on two factors: how harmful the crime
is (h + w), where harm includes the expected injustice and sanctioning cost per
committed crime, and how large a fraction of the criminal population will be
deterred by a lowering of the standard (®s).
An Application to the Crime of Sexual Violation Against Women
Trials of alleged sexual violation must often be decided by the court on the
basis of evidence that leaves room for doubt.
To insert into the formula:
prob(g j ex¤) = µ + c
(h +w)®s+ (Q¡ c) + (µ + c)
we need estimates for µ, Q, h, c, w, s, ® and q: In the following, the numbers
apply to Denmark, but it should be obvious that a similar analysis can be carried
out for any other jurisdiction12.
One variable can be chosen freely, let us set Q = 1:
To establish the social welfare function, I conducted a survey among a group
of graduate students and faculty at Copenhagen Business School, whom I asked
for their preferences concerning the ratios of µ=Q and µ=h.
The exact wording of the survey is in the appendix. Below, ¯gure 1 and ¯gure
2 present the answers to the two questions, respectively.
12In the appendix, a similar analysis is conducted for the US.
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Figure 1: How many guilty people are you willing to let go free in order to
avoid that someone is wrongly convicted of sexual violation against women?
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Figure 2: How many sexual violations can you/are you willing to accept in or-
der to avoid that someone is wrongly convicted of sexual violation against women?
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Note that women attach a higher cost to false acquittals and to the crime,
relative to the cost of a false conviction, than men do, as one might perhaps
expect.
Society's preferences will be taken to be equal to the median answer in the
total population. In the group of 49 respondents, the median preference for µ=Q
was a ratio of 10:1, while the median ratio for µ=h was 5:113.
The respondents were not asked to take into account the cost, c, to society of
applying the sanction, and presumably did not do so. The average sanction is a
year and a half and the o®ender is released after serving 2/3 of the time, so the
e®ective average sanction is one year. The cost, c, has been estimated at 35; 000$
per year and the question is what this amounts to in terms of utility. It may
be compared with the value of avoiding one violation which in utility terms has
been set at 2 (by the fact that Q = 1; µ=Q = 10 and µ=h = 5). The monetary
value of avoiding one violation is of course controversial; if we assume it is in the
interval between 200; 000$ and 300; 000$14, then, since the utility 2 equals between
200; 000$ and 300; 000$, the amount of 35; 000$ is approximately in the interval
between 1=6 and 1=9. Since it will not be very important to our results where in
the interval it lies, this will not be pursued any further.
In the expression for w: w = (1¡q)Q+Fg(ex)qQ+(1¡Fi(ex))qµ+qc(1¡Fi(ex)+
1¡Fg(ex)), the ¯rst two terms, (1¡ q)Q+Fg(ex)qQ, dominate the others. This is
due to the fact that only 60 of 1000 criminal acts lead to conviction. Since 940 of
1000 o®enders are not sanctioned, the expected injustice cost of wrong acquittals
is 9401000 £Q = :94. Thus, w ' 1, so h+ w ' 3:
The variable s is the level of the sanction in terms of disutility. As noted,
it is approximately one years' imprisonment15. The disutility of this sanction to
the criminal is di±cult to estimate. Given that h ' 2, let us assume as a very
rough approximation that s = 1=2, meaning that one year in prison corresponds
13It should be mentioned that some respondents expressed the view that nothing could com-
pensate for a wrong conviction; when calculating median preferences, I treated this view the
same as the view that the cost is very high (1000 and above). Likewise, some people gave the
answer 0, which was treated as the same as a very low answer when calculating the median. Both
the answer 1 and the answer 0 may be interpreted as claiming that costs are incommensurable.
14Cohen et al [4] estimate society's willingness to pay for one less rape or sexual assault to be
237,000 $.
15This level may be lower than optimal which may have some e®ect on the results concerning
the optimal standard of proof. If the sanction were increased, crime would fall, and it would
then be more di±cult to achieve a further decline in the level of crime. This suggests that
lowering the standard of proof and increasing the sanct¶ion are (strategic) substitutes, but it
should be added that there are other cross-e®ects. The issue will not be pursued further here.
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to one fourth the utility loss of a violation. This utility loss should be understood
to include social sanctions following a guilty verdict. Still the number may be
controversial; the reader can explore alternative assumptions.
An estimate of ®, i.e. of z(ev)=(1¡Z(ev)), can be obtained as follows: z(v) equals
dZ(v)
dv , i.e. z(v
¤) equals the decrease in the fraction of the population which follows
one unit's increase in v¤; i.e. one unit's increase in the expected sanction. If we
substitute the actual value of ~x¤ for the optimal, then since v¤ = s£q£ 1R
~x¤
fg(x)dx;
and q £ 1R
~x¤
fg(x)dx approximately equals 601000 = 6%, the expected sanction equals
around 0:03 since s equals 1/2. To calculate dZ(v)dv ; assume that the expected
sanction is increased from 0:03 to 0:04: If it is assumed that the elasticity of crime
with respect to the expected sanction is ¡0:116, an increase in the sanction of 33 13
% creates a 2.8% decrease in crime, which corresponds to 28 violations per year17.
Hence, dZ(v)dv equals
18 15
0:01 = 2800, and ® then equals 2800=1000 = 2:8:
To calculate q, which is the probability that the evidence is beyond y1
2
, i.e.
the probability that the evidence points to the prime suspect with a probabil-
ity at or higher than 50%, note that the total number of reported violations is
approximately 500 per year of which approximately 225 end up in court and 60
lead to a prison sentence19. If we assume that only one in two sexual violations is
reported, which is the o±cial estimate, the total number of violations is 100020.
If we can assume that for crimes that end up in court, the probability is higher
than :5, clearly q must exceed 2251000, since 225 cases do end up in court out of the
1000 yearly crimes. On the other hand, 500 crimes go unreported, so no evidence
is forthcoming at all. q cannot therefore exceed 12. So q lies between 22:5% and
50%. Note furthermore that of the 500 reported there must be a number of cases
where the o®ender is not found. On the other hand, of the 275 cases that are
16This is a low ¯gure. Donohue and Seigelman [7] use the number ¡0:15 and denote it the
consensus estimate.
17If the elasticity is ¡0:1, the percentage decrease in the level of crime as a consequence of
increasing the sanction by 33:3%, would be 1 ¡ 1:333¡0:1 = 2:8%:
18Both the numerator and the denominator should be divided by the size of the population
which then cancels out.
19Source: Statistical Yearbook 2001, Table 217 [27].
20An organisation protecting the rights of victims of sexual violation, the Joan-Sisters, esti-
mates that the number is much higher, between 5000 and 10000 whereas the o±cial estimate
is 1000. The o±cial estimate is closer to the number that victimization studies ¯nd in the US;
the estimated percentage of reported rapes was 53,7% in 2002, according to Bureau of Justice
Statistics, see p. 11 in http://www.rainn.org/ncvs2002.pdf.
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reported but not taken to court, there must be some for which the probability of
guilt exceeds 12. Based on these considerations q will be taken to be approximately
:35.
Given these assumptions, and assuming that the cost of sanctioning is 1=6,
the optimal standard of proof becomes:
pg =
µ + c
(h+ w)®s+ (Q¡ c) + (µ + c) =
10 + 16
(3 £ 2:8£ 0:5) + (1 ¡ 16) + (10 + 16)
= :67
In comparison, the optimal standard becomes:
pg =
10 + 16
10 + 16 + 1¡ 16
= 92%
in the absence of a preventive e®ect, if the cost of sanctioning is 1=6.
To see what is behind the result that :67 is the optimal standard when the
preventive e®ect is included, consider the consequences of lowering the standard
of proof from 75% to 65%. If, say, 100 o®enders are convicted at 75% certainty21,
and 10 more defendants are convicted when the standard is lowered (this number
is irrelevant since all e®ects are scaled up or down) to 65%, of these approximately
7 will be guilty while 3 will be innocent, assuming that defendants' probabilities
of guilt are uniformly distributed on the interval from 75% to 65%. The added
cost in terms of unfair convictions is then 10 16 £ 3, and the added bene¯t in terms
of corrections of wrongful acquittals is 7 ¤ (1 ¡ 16): From a justice viewpoint,
costs exceed bene¯ts by approximately 24-25 utils. However, the increase in the
expected sanction will be approximately 10=100 = 10%, so violations will decrease
by 1¡ 1:1¡0:1 = :9% which amount to 9 fewer violations. This adds 27 in utility
(h+ w = 3). Given our assumptions, marginal bene¯ts are higher than marginal
costs when prevention is taken into account; this re°ects that the standard is too
high at 75%.
Applying the proposition of this paper to the case of sexual violation hence
leads to the conclusion mentioned in the introduction: If `beyond a reasonable
standard' can be taken to mean approximately 95%, and `clear and convincing
evidence' to mean approximately 75% certainty, as has been suggested by Schauer
and Zeckhauser [24] and others, the optimal standard is closer to `clear and con-
vincing evidence' than to `beyond a reasonable standard' when the e®ect of the
standard of proof on prevention of crime is taken into account.
21compared with 60 at the existing, higher standard. The number 100 is chosen for illustration.
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Discussion
This section discusses some general issues and some objections that may be
raised against the theory and the application.
A basic issue is the choice of social welfare function. It was assumed in this
paper that when people express a strong preference for not sanctioning the inno-
cent, this may be taken at face value as expressing a strong preference for avoiding
an unjust outcome. Against this view, it has been argued that people are more
concerned with the risk that they themselves will be wrongly convicted than with
justice for others, and that the analysis can therefore be framed in terms of e±-
ciency in a narrow sense. However, it may be replied that the view that people
are only concerned about their own risk of false conviction is not con¯rmed by
the survey. Both men and women report strong preferences for not sanctioning
the innocent (although women are in general somewhat less concerned than men,
as shown in ¯gure 1), and women's concern is hard to reconcile with the view
that they should be simply risk averse, since women need not fear being falsely
convicted for sexual violation.
The theory presented in this paper can also be criticized on the basis that
it is morally wrong for society to (purposely) risk convicting an innocent person
in order to avoid crime, i.e. in order to avoid that some other person commits
a wrong22. However, stated in this way the criticism is too strong, for if it is
generally wrong to risk convicting an innocent person, then the very existence
of a legal system must also be wrong, for we know that any legal system will
inevitably make mistakes23.
In a similar vein, it may be held that for ethical reasons, society should rather
change other policy variables, e.g. increase the level of police e®ort, the size of
sanctions, or establish social programs that help potential o®enders, rather than
to compromise on the fundamental value of `legal security'. However, to this
criticism it can be replied that crime will persist also when all of these other
variables are set at their optimal level, and that the expression for the optimal
standard derived in this paper can be understood as taking these variables as
22This moral dilemma is mentioned also by Miceli [13] (p. 6) who gives references to discus-
sions by Nozick and Elster.
23So the point needs to be put in terms of degree: it can more reasonably be argued that
there is a limit to the degree to which society can in a utilitarian fashion sacri¯ce the interests
of possibly innocent defendants in order to bene¯t other members of society. This cannot be
entered further into here.
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given at their optimal level.
Concerning the application to sexual violation, it may be objected that this
crime does not fall into the category for which the risk of unfair conviction does not
a®ect the incentive for committing the crime, and that the crime therefore cannot
be used as an application of the model. Arguably, a man who has chosen not to
commit a particular act of sexual violation may nevertheless be falsely accused
of it. However, there is reason to be skeptical of the idea that the risk of unfair
conviction will signi¯cantly a®ect incentives for committing sexual violation, since
either the woman consents or she does not; if she does not, the possibility of
having voluntary intercourse is not present, and if the man then abstains, the
risk of being accused of sexual violation afterwards is very small, since there has
been no intercourse. Thus, it seems likely that false accusations do not increase
incentives for committing sexual violation to any signi¯cant extent24.
The question may be raised what quantitative expressions for the standard of
proof really mean. For example, what does it mean in terms of jury-instructions
to say that the standard is 67%? This issue cannot be fully dealt with here, except
by noting that it should not be taken for granted that standards of proof cannot
be expressed quantitatively in terms of probabilities of guilt. Thus, in an overview
of the literature on how jurors make decisions, Michael Saks [23] (section 6) notes
that: ... `several studies have found that the applicable standard of proof is best
comprehended by jurors when it is presented to them in the one way that the
courts refuse to use: by way of quantitative metaphors'.
However, while quantitative expressions or metaphors may be better grasped
by jurors than verbal statements, one may fear that if a jury is told to apply a
given quanti¯ed standard, it will do so with error, and that this will increase the
likelihood of innocent conviction. How exactly the potential for error a®ects that
standard which one would want the jury and the judge to follow is a question that
will be left to future research.
Finally, it may be objected that the survey is unlikely to yield reliable in-
formation concerning people's true preferences for justice versus e±ciency. It is
well-known that answers may depend on the way questions are phrased. Whether
such is the case here remains to be seen. It may also be objected that several
respondents seem not to share the utilitarian logic of this paper. In the ¯rst
question, 15 of the 49 answers and in the second, 13 of the 49 answers can be in-
terpreted as denying that logic (including both the answer in¯nite and the answer
24Although it may be argued, theoretically, that the incentive to achieve consent will be lower
when consent does not preclude conviction.
17
zero). On the other hand, a strong majority, more than 2/3 of the total group of
respondents, were in fact willing to quantify their preferences.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the consequences of viewing the standard of proof as
determined by justice concerns as well as by the concern for prevention of crime. It
has demonstrated that the optimal standard can be derived from two properties
of the social welfare function together with an estimate of the elasticity of the
number of crimes with respect to the expected sanction. The two properties are:
the marginal rate of substitution between a false conviction and a false acquittal,
and the marginal rate of substitution between a false conviction and a criminal
act. Thus, for any crime, given an estimate of the size of the preventive e®ect,
the optimal standard can be derived from the answer to two questions: how
many o®enders is society willing to let go to avoid sanctioning one person who is
innocent?, and how many criminal acts is society willing to accept to avoid that
one person is innocently convicted? In the paper, the social welfare function was
derived from median responses to the two questions among a group of 50 people
(mainly graduate students), for the crime of sexual violation. For this crime, the
aim of preventing crime was shown to have a signi¯cant e®ect on the socially
desirable standard of proof.
Let me ¯nally add that the spirit of this article has not been to suggest that
wrong convictions should be taken lightly; as revealed by the answers to the survey,
social `costs' of wrongful convictions are high. Rather, the idea was that while
the wrongful convictions are `costly', so are criminal o®enses to the victims, and
that it may therefore be misleading to only consider injustice costs when setting
the standard of proof.
Appendix 1
The Survey
Dear Colleague/Student,
I am writing to request your participation in a short questionnaire. All par-
ticipants will remain anonymous. The answers will be used in an article I am
writing on the burden of proof in criminal law. The issue to be looked at in the
article deals with the degree of certainty required before a man is convicted of
sexual violation.
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In the ¯rst question, please ignore the fact that the punishment can act as a
deterrent. Instead, focus exclusively on your sense of justice. There are, however,
two things to consider in contrast to one another. On the one hand, with regard
to justice, it is important to avoid convicting someone who is innocent, while on
the other hand it can seem unjust (also for the victim) if someone who is guilty
is not convicted. If high demands are made on the strength of the evidence,
fewer innocent people will be convicted while more guilty people will go free.
Fewer innocent people will be convicted while more guilty people will go free, the
stronger the evidence required.
Question 1) How many guilty people are you willing to let go free in order to
avoid that someone is wrongly convicted of sexual violation against women?
a) 1
b) 5
c) 10
d) 20
e) 100
f) 1000
g) an in¯nite number, impossible to compensate
h) other, please specify the amount
In the second question, please take into consideration that the punishment can
act as a deterrent. Please assume that fewer innocent people will be convicted, but
that more people will be in danger of being violated because the deterrent a®ect
will be small/will not be as great. There is no logical connection between this
and the above question, which means that one can give any answer whatsoever
without contradicting ones self.
Question 2) How many sexual violations can you/are you willing to accept
in order to avoid that someone is wrongly convicted of sexual violation against
women?
a) 1
b) 5
c) 10
d) 20
e) 100
f) 1000
g) an in¯nite number, impossible to compensate
h) other, please specify the amount.
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Please indicate whether you are male or female.
Appendix 2
The optimal standard in the US
The following calculations of the optimal standard of proof in the US for the
crime of sexual violation should be treated with caution. For one thing, the
estimates of the the injustice costs are derived from a group of Danish students
and faculty and the di®erence in the length of the prison sentence in Denmark
and the US may be due to di®erent preferences for justice.
In the US, the total number of sexual violations is approximately 147.000 per
year25 of which approximately 90186 are reported to the police and l¯ed by the
police, 22964 lead to arrests and 10600 are convicted26. The mean expected time
served in prison is 88 months27; let us assume that the utility loss is at least three
times larger than that in Denmark (where the sentence served is more than ¯ve
times shorter, and prison conditions are perhaps not as rough). Thus, assume
that s = 3: If the cost to society of sanctioning was between 1=3 and 2=3 in the
Danish case, and the prison sentence served is nearly ¯ve times longer in the US,
we can assume that the cost of the sanction to society is something in the order
of 7=3 in utility terms. Assume further that (h+ w) ' 3, as in Denmark. ® can
be calculated as follows: z(v) equals dZ(v)dv , i.e. z(v
¤) equals the decrease in the
fraction of the population which follows one unit's increase in v¤; i.e. one unit's
increase in the expected sanction. If we substitute the actual value of ~x¤ for the
optimal, then since v¤ = s £ q £ 1R
~x¤
fg(x)dx; and q £
1R
~x¤
fg(x)dx approximately
equals 10600147160 = 7:2%, the expected sanction equals
10600
147160 £ 2 = 14:4%. If the
sanction is increased by 1 percentage point to 15.4 %, i.e. increased by 0:01:144 = 7%
, and if the elasticity is ¡0:1, the percentage decrease in the level of crime as a
consequence of increasing the sanction by 7%, would be 1¡ 1:06944¡0:1 = 0:67%:
That would amount to 147160£ :67% = 986 fewer violations. Hence, dZ(v)dv equals
986
0:01 = 98600 and ® then equals 98600=147160 = :67.
25According to the Bureau of Justice's Crime Vicitmization Survey for 2000, see
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus0002.pdf , table 26.
26These numbers are for the year 2000, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Felony
Convictions in State Courts, 2000: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/b js/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf. By far
the largest part of convictions are in State courts.
27See p.5 in Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Felony Convictions in State Courts, 2000:
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf
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Given all of this, the optimal standard of proof becomes: pg = µ+cµ+c+®s(h+w)+Q¡c =
10+73
10+73+0:67¤2¤3+1¡ 73 = 82%
It may be worth emphasizing that this calculation should be considered to be
preliminary. The purpose here was to do a rough calculation.
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